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PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY RIGHTS:
EVENING OUT THE PLAYING FIELD FOR
CELEBRITIES AND PRIVATE CITIZENS IN THE
MODERN GAME OF MASS MEDIA
Fame is a bee.
It has a song-
It has a sting-
Ah, too, it has a wing.
-Emily Dickinson'
INTRODUCTION
As Sir Robert Walpole said over one hundred years ago, "all ...
men have their price."'2 Indeed, in this modern age of pervasive com-
mercial influence through mass media, when anything of value to one
person is potentially another person's profit, individual personas are
no exception to the rule that what will be bought will be sold. This is
evident in the immense value of the highly coveted celebrity endorse-
ment in the marketing of commercial products. 3 While some manu-
facturers claim "image is nothing,"' 4 the marketing practices employed
and the billions of dollars expended on celebrity endorsements in ad-
vertising demonstrate otherwise. 5 The use of well-known identities in
commercial marketing responds to our national psyche. 6 As a culture,
we have demonstrated that we place stock in the ability of a product
to aid in our quest to "Be Like Mike," 7 and in other ways to emulate
1. THE COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON 713 (Thomas H. Johnson ed., 1957).
2. See JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 295 (Justin Kaplan et al. eds., 16th ed. 1996).
3. See ROBERT GOLDMAN & STEPHEN PAPSON, SIGN WARS: THE CLUTTERED LANDSCAPE OF
ADVERTISING 38 (1996). In the market of celebrity endorsement, "the rule of thumb has gener-
ally been 'the bigger the celebrity, the more handsome the sign value."' Id.
4. Id. at 5 (Goldman and Papson discuss the mid-1990s Sprite campaign slogans "Obey your
thirst" and "image is nothing," as examples of "anti-signs.").
5. See id. at 20. Celebrity tennis star Andre Agassi responded to Sprite's sentiment by ex-
claiming, "Image is everything!" in a commercial for Canon brand cameras.
6. See Gretchen A. Pemberton, The Parodist's Claim to Fame: A Parody Exception to the
Right of Publicity, 27 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 97, 120 (1993) ("[Cjelebrities' power to 'sell' commod-
ities with which they are associated proves that their images mean something to consumers.
Their economic value (their 'associative' or 'publicity' value . . . ) derives from their 'semiotic'
power ... to carry and provoke meanings.").
7. See GOLDMAN & PAPSON, supra note 3, at 3. By 1996, Nike had gained a larger percentage
of the commercial market than competitor Reebok as a result of its ability to "effectively harness
the power of Michael Jordan's image." See Pemberton, supra note 6, at 123-24 ("[T]he public
admires its celebrity heroes and will adopt their opinions and emulate their behavior and ap-
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our pop culture icons. Indeed, it "says a great deal about modern
America that no society has ever had as many celebrities as ours or
has revered them as intensely."' 8 One author characterizes the role of
the celebrity in modern culture by stating:
Celebrities symbolize individual aspirations, group identities, and
cultural values. Celebrities are common points of reference for mil-
lions of individuals who may never interact with one another, but
who share, by virtue of their participation in a mediated culture, a
common experience and a collective memory. We use celebrities as
symbols to express ourselves and to communicate with one another.
They are the peculiar, yet familiar idiom in which we conduct a fair
portion of our cultural business and everyday conversation.9
The associative value of a persona in the commercial marketplace
cannot be underestimated. This concept is at the core of the legal
right of publicity, a right intended to protect an individual's economic
interest in his or her identity, and is the subject of this Comment.
Yet the rich and famous are not necessarily the only personas that
qualify as marketable commodities.10 The recent craze in "reality tel-
evision" suggests a powerful fascination in our culture with the com-
mon person."a However, for those individuals whose identity is of
economic value only to themselves, there is a lack of protection under
the right of publicity when that identity is used for the commercial
purposes of another without consent. Although, in theory, noncele-
brities have a right to publicity,12 this right is often neglected in prac-
tice. Moreover, the aggrieved private individual faces a significant
challenge in effecting recovery under the right of privacy, the tradi-
pearance.... Today, celebrities are indirectly and directly influential in almost every sphere of
consciousness-from fashion to sexual morality to politics.").
8. See NEAL GABLER, LIFE THE MOVIE: How ENTERTAINMENT CONQUERED REALITY
(1998); see generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1 (1997) (analyzing the devel-
opment of the modem cultural fascination with fame and its connection to the legal right of
publicity).
9. See Pemberton, supra note 6, at 118-19 (citations omitted).
10. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?,
17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 191, 202 (1983) (Arguing for a "universal right of publicity," Professor
Kwall explains that noncelebrity endorsement is a reality of modem advertising.).
11. See Todd Leopold, How Much Reality TV Can We Survive?, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
SHOWBIZrTV/05/01/reality.tv/index.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2004) (discussing the prevalence
of reality television programming, examining specific shows, and offering explanations for the
unrelenting popularity of this brand of entertainment); see also Tom Shales, All Too Real, WASH.
POST, Jan. 13, 2003, at C1 (criticizing reality programming and claiming that of "TV's long road
of wretched excess, few excesses have seemed as wretched as the current outbreak of reality
shows").
12. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 4:14, at 4-17 (2d ed.
2003) ("[T]he majority of commentators and courts hold that everyone, celebrity and nonceleb-
rity alike, has a right of publicity.").
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tional avenue of relief available to private individuals, as courts grant
broad deference to countervailing free speech interests.13 Unlike the
unjust enrichment theory of recovery employed in publicity claims, 14
success in asserting a personal or emotional claim brought under the
right of privacy is often unattainable absent a showing of an exclu-
sively commercial use of identity. 15
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the current state of the
law regarding the misappropriation of identity, embodied in the rights
of privacy and publicity, as it pertains to both celebrities and
noncelebrities alike. While the rights of privacy and publicity, the
"conjoined twins of modern media society,"' 6 each protects individu-
als from unauthorized use of their name and likeness to promote an-
other's business or product without their consent,17 the cause of
action, at least for private individuals, 18 must be aligned with the harm
to be reconciled. Specifically, recovery under the right of publicity re-
quires a showing of economic harm.19 An economic value in that
identity is, therefore, condition precedent to such a claim. Although
this monetary value is established easily by celebrities, given our cul-
tural fascination with and commodification of famous personas, aver-
age private citizens can rarely assert an economic value in their
identity to sustain a publicity claim.20 Because claims brought under
the right of publicity and privacy often reflect the same individual in-
terests, be they economic or personal, assertion of and subsequent
success of a claim is often dependent on the status of the individual
and not the interest at issue.
Part II of this Comment will trace the lineage of misappropriation
of identity as a legal claim: its birth in the concept of privacy, the First
Amendment limitations on this right, its splintering into the offshoot
right of publicity, and the present status and scope of each right. Fol-
lowing this foundation, the analysis in Part III will focus on the judi-
cial approaches to determining "commercial" use of identity and
assessing First Amendment implications in right of privacy claims. In
13. See infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
16. See Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back To Light Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of the
Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 221 (1999).
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977).
18. See infra notes 187-193 and accompanying text.
19. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Landham v. Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2000)) "[A]II that a plaintiff must prove in a right
of publicity action is that she has a pecuniary interest in her identity, and that her identity has
been commercially exploited by a defendant.
20. See infra notes 187-193 and accompanying text.
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particular, Part III will examine the seemingly disparate burden of the
First Amendment as it is imposed upon private individuals asserting
claims against unauthorized use of identity compared to the broad
deference afforded to famous persons who bring economic claims
under the right of publicity. Part IV will discuss the state of this area
of law and its correlation to the modern cultural regard for fame and
celebrity. Part IV will further address the possible approaches to
calming the storm of confusion surrounding the right of publicity.
Given its inherent conflict with the First Amendment, the right of
publicity must be tailored to yield to all protectible uses of identity.
As a corollary, the concept of unjust enrichment must be expanded to
encompass more readily claims brought by anonymous individuals.
Clarification of these problematic issues and exploration into possible
analytical approaches seek to aid in the goal of furthering the pur-
poses of both privacy and publicity law such that the economic and
emotional interests of all people in their own identity will be legally
protected from unauthorized commercial use.
This Comment is not a condemnation of the right of publicity, al-
though inconsistencies and deficiencies are evident. Rather, in sup-
port of the right of publicity and its continuing development, this
Comment sets forth two primary contentions: 1) that all persons
should be protected against economic and emotional injury resulting
from the unauthorized use of identity for commercial purposes; and 2)
that a "commercial purpose" should be clearly defined and narrowly
construed to avoid any infringement upon freedom of speech, particu-
larly regarding the cultural necessities of parody and commentary.
While it is arguable that the current state of the law reflects such har-
mony, case law demonstrates a need for further improvement in the
promotion of the interests protected under both privacy and publicity
law. As Professor Melville Nimmer stated in his highly influential law
review article advocating the right of publicity, "only the unhurried
occurrence of actual cases" will clearly establish the limitations and
scope of this right.21 This Comment will explore how case law has
been both successful and inadequate in defining that scope, and the
measures needed to ensure consistent and just results for all seeking
protection from unauthorized commercial use of identity.
21. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216
(1954).
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II. BACKGROUND
Since its inception, 22 the right of publicity has been the subject of
exhaustive comment, criticism, and controversy.23 Although it is well
established that the right of publicity grew out of the right of pri-
vacy,24 the exact evolution of the former from the latter and the pre-
sent correlation between the two independent rights is a subject of
much disagreement and debate. 25 Familial terms have been employed
to analogize the relationship between these two rights; the right of
publicity has been coined the right of privacy's "stepchild" 26 and
"flashier cousin," 27 the former created from the latter, its "parent," 28
as "Eve from Adam's rib."'2 9 The confused intermingling of these two
independent rights, rooted in fundamentally different legal interests, 30
has earned this cross-section of the law its infamous nickname: "hay-
stack in a hurricane." 31 In order to examine the present relationship
between the right of privacy and that of publicity, an examination of
22. In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals first determined that celebrities have the right to recover for
the misappropriation of their identity for the commercial benefit of others and that this right
exists independently from the right of privacy.
23. Compare Sheldon Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the As-
sociative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1986) (outlining the movement of law in
recognizing the right of publicity and arguing that sound justification for the emergence of this
right exists and the necessity of its common law recognition), with Michael Madow, Private Own-
ership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993) (argu-
ing that the adoption of the right of publicity into American law was erroneous because no
adequate justification for the existence of this right has been asserted).
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995); see also Kwall,
supra note 10, at 193 ("[P]ublicity's genesis in the right of privacy is undisputed.").
25. See Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who?: The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE
L.J. 383, 388 (1999) ("The resultant (and often convoluted) bifurcation of publicity and privacy
interests has engendered intractable doctrinal confusion.").
26. See David R. Ginsburg, Comment, Transfer of the Right of Publicity: Dracula's Progeny
and Privacy's Stepchild, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1103 (1975).
27. See Kahn, supra note 16, at 214 ("In case after case, even while demanding restitution for
the converted monetary value of their names and images, celebrities invoke dignitary concerns
as a prime motivation for their attempt to protect and vindicate the integrity of their identities
before the law.").
28. See Kwall, supra note 10, at 193.
29. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.8[A], at 5-68 (1999).
30. The right of publicity is deemed a property interest. The right of privacy, however, is the
right against injury to one's emotions. See Kahn, supra note 16, at 215. "Publicity rights demand
accountants and other relevant experts from the realm of ... marketing to determine damages.
Appropriation calls upon the local community to consider whether an outrage or affront to rele-
vant social norms has occurred." Id.
31. This expression was first espoused in Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229
F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956), by Chief Judge Biggs who was commenting on the state of the law
governing the right of privacy. It has since been used to generally describe the confusion sur-
rounding the rights of privacy and publicity.
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the historical development of the concept of a legal interest in one's
identity, which is central to each right, is essential. This section will
discuss the historical correlation between the right of privacy and the
right of publicity and the present scope of and limitations on each
right.
A. Privacy: Human Good to Legal Right
Privacy, as an abstract concept, has been considered throughout
time and culture as an elevated human good.32 One author articulates
this inherent human desire for privacy as follows:
Man's desire to be private is ancient, intense and takes many forms.
He seeks the privacy of his thoughts, his person, his home, his pa-
pers and other effects, and his communications to others. He seeks
to be private from the state, whose undue intrusion into his spheres
of privacy is oppressive; and he seeks to be private from other indi-
viduals, whose intrusions are offensive rather than oppressive, but
no less unwelcome.33
Samuel Warren and William Brandeis first introduced the concept of a
legally recognized "right to privacy," or the right "to be left alone" in
a compelling and controversial law review article published in 1890. 34
Since its introduction, the article, which champions a legally based
right against intrusion into the private affairs and lifestyle of private
individuals, has been revered for its profound impact on modern
law.35 Yet the early judicial response to the concept proposed by War-
ren and Brandeis was less than favorable. The court in Roberson v.
32. See RICHARD F. HIXSON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 3
(1987). Hixson maintains that the role of "privacy" in the biblical story of Adam and Eve dem-
onstrates the tremendous consideration this concept has been given throughout the cultural and
historical development of mankind.
33. Laura M. Murray Richards, Comment, Arrington v. New York Times Company: A Missed
Opportunity To Recognize a Constitutional Right to Privacy of Personality, 26 How. L.J. 1579,
1584 (1983) (citations omitted).
34. Samuel D. Warren & William Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890);
see generally Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren's The Right to Privacy and the Birth of
the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623 (2002).
35. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1051 (1941) ("[N]o other
tort has seen such an outpouring of comment in advocacy of its bare existence."); see also Nim-
mer, supra note 21, at 203, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954) ("perhaps the most famous
and certainly the most influential law review article ever written"); see also HIxsoN, supra note
32, at 29. According to Hixson, Roscoe Pound, the Dean of Harvard Law School at the time the
article came out, stated that Warren and Brandeis had "done nothing less than added a chapter
to our law." Professor Bratman stated:
In their twenty-eight page piece, Brandeis and Warren chastised the journalists of their
day, particularly photojournalists, for prying into people's private lives in search of taw-
dry and alluring "news,"and then made a cogent plea for the law to recognize a right of
privacy and to impose liability in tort for these and other types of invasions of privacy.
Bratman, supra note 34, at 624.
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Rochester Folding Box Co.,36 unpersuaded by the Warren and Bran-
deis article, rejected an emotional distress claim for the unauthorized
use of an individual's photograph in an advertisement. 37 It was the
dissenting opinion in that case, provided by Judge Gray38 that became
the "fountainhead .. .of the right as expounded in the majority of
later cases."' 39 In response to the Roberson decision, the New York
State Legislature enacted a statutory provision prohibiting the use
"for advertising purposes, or for purposes of trade" of the "name, por-
trait, or picture of any living person" without consent. 40
The common law right of privacy was first recognized in Pavesich v.
New England Life Insurance Co.,41 wherein the Supreme Court of
Georgia, quoting heavily from Judge Gray's dissent in Roberson,42
recognized the plaintiff's right of privacy claim for the defendant's use
36. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
37. The court in Roberson rejected the Warren and Brandeis article and refused to recognize
the right of privacy for an infant whose guardian brought suit against the defendants for their
unauthorized use of the infant's picture on posters advertising flour. Id. at 447-48. The Court
interpreted the proposed right to mean that "the individual has the right to prevent his features
from becoming known to those outside his circle of friends and acquaintances." Id. at 443. The
majority also reasoned that indoctrinating this theory into common law would produce "litiga-
tion bordering on the absurd, for the right of privacy ... must necessarily embrace as well the
publication of a word-picture, a comment upon one's looks, conduct, domestic relations or
habit." Id. The majority did recognize that proper legislation could tailor this right to protect the
unauthorized use of likeness for the selfish gain of the defendant but declined to act in place of
the legislature on this issue. Id.
38. Id. at 450. Judge Gray disagreed with the majority's rejection of plaintiff's claim of injury
to her feelings on the grounds that there was no common law precedent for such an action,
stating:
[T]he proposition is, to me, an inconceivable one that these defendants may, unautho-
rizedly, use the likeness of this young woman upon their advertisement, as a method of
attracting widespread public attention to their wares, and that she must submit to the
mortifying notoriety, without right to invoke the exercise of the preventive power of a
court of equity . . . if her face or her portraiture has a value, the value is hers exclu-
sively, until the use be granted away to the public. Any other principle of decision, in
my opinion, is as repugnant to equity as it is shocking to reason.
64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
39. See Canessa v. J. I. Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d 62, 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1962).
40. See N.Y. Civ. RIGrrs LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 2000).
41. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). The unanimous opinion of the Pavesich court, written by Judge
(FIRST NAME) Cobb, predicted that the previous failure of courts to recognize the right of
privacy would be regarded by future courts in the same regard as the present judiciary regards
the injustices of the Salem witch trials. He wrote:
So thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recognizes.. .the right of privacy.., that we
venture.., to predict that the day will come when the American bar will marvel that a
contrary view was ... ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability ... just as in
the present day we stand amazed ... that Lord Hale, with perfect composure of man-
ner and complete satisfaction of soul, imposed the death penalty for witchcraft on igno-
rant and harmless women.
Id. at 80-81.
42. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 448.
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of the plaintiff's picture in a newspaper advertisement for life insur-
ance. The right of privacy gained stronger support subsequent to the
publication of an influential article by Professor William L. Prosser.4 3
Professor Prosser identified protection under the right of privacy to
exist in four separate respects." Professor Prosser's four-pronged
model of the legal right of privacy was ultimately included in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.45 From the Warren and Brandeis article
emerged a solidly established legal right against the unauthorized use
of an individual's name or likeness for the commercial benefit of
another.46
B. First Amendment Limitations on Individual Privacy Interests
1. The "Newsworthiness" Exception
Given the broad protection afforded under the First Amendment,
an unauthorized use of identity must be "commercial" in order to vio-
late the right of privacy. In Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc. ,7 the Supreme
Court of New York articulated the distinction between commercial
and noncommercial uses for the purpose of determining violations of
the right of privacy. Specifically, a use is commercial if it constitutes a
"solicitation for patronage." On the contrary, a use of identity in any
type of publication involving matters of current news or immediate
public interest is considered noncommercial.4 8 Therefore, when the
use of identity is considered to involve a matter of public interest, a
right of privacy claim must fail. In Lahiri, the plaintiff was denied
recovery for invasion of privacy by misappropriation of identity
against the defendant for the use of the plaintiff's photograph in con-
nection with an article attempting to expose the "Hindu rope trick" as
an illusion. 49
As in Lahiri, the following cases illustrate permissible unauthorized
uses of identity in connection with matters deemed "public interest."
43. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
44. Id. at 401-05. According to Prosser, the right of privacy also protected against: (i) intru-
sion on physical solitude, (ii) public disclosure of private facts, (iii) placing the plaintiff in a false
light in the public eye, and (iv) appropriation for the defendant's benefit of the plaintiff's name
or likeness. Id.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-§ 6521 (1977).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625C addresses appropriation of another's name or
likeness for personal benefit.
47. 295 N.Y.S. 382, 386 (Gen. Term 1937).
48. Id. at 389.
49. Id. at 383. Plaintiff was a well-known Hindu musician and the photograph in question
featured him playing a musical instrument as an accompaniment to a female dancer.
1254 [Vol. 53:1247
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In Arrington v. New York Times Co.,50 the plaintiff, a black male,
could not recover against the defendant corporation, a newspaper
publisher, for the unauthorized use of his photograph in connection
with an article entitled "The Black Middle Class: Making It.'' 51 The
article was considered a matter of public interest and the plaintiff was
unable to show that his photograph bore no reasonable relationship to
the article or that it was an advertisement in disguise.52 In Lerman v.
Flynt Distributing Co.,5 3 an article misidentified the plaintiff54 as the
woman depicted in two illicit photographs.5 5 The photographs were
stills of a movie based on a book written by the plaintiff, which was
the subject of the article. In Jackson v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc.,56
three minor boys were also denied their invasion of privacy claims. An
adult magazine pictured the three boys with a female police officer,
along with several nude photographs of the police officer, in an article
and layout entitled "Beauty and The Badge. ' '57 In each of the forego-
ing cases, despite the plaintiffs' assertions of a personal privacy inter-
est, the publication at issue was entitled to the First Amendment
"newsworthiness" exception because the use of identity was deemed
to involve matters of public interest.
2. A Solicitation for Patronage
While the use of an individual's identity is wholly permissible so
long as it is done for a "newsworthy purpose," if that use is found to
be "commercial" in nature, it is unprotected. Such a "commercial"
use, defined as a "solicitation for patronage," was found in Flores v.
50. 434 N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. 1982).
51. Id. at 1320; see also Richards, supra note 33, at 1579. Richards noted:
"Clarence W. Arrington, an attractive, well-dressed Black businessman, was walking
down a street in Manhattan one day in 1978 when, without his knowledge or consent,
his photograph was taken by a freelance photographer, Gianfranco Gorgoni. Arring-
ton, at that time a financial analyst for General Motors, had done nothing to attract
attention or to make himself a newsworthy figure. Gorgoni was working on an assign-
ment for the New York Times to shoot pictures of middle-class Blacks to illustrate an
upcoming article. Arrington fit the description." Id.
52. Id. at 1322-23.
53. 745 F.2d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1984).
54. It should be noted that the plaintiff in this case was Jackie Collins Lerman, a well-known
author. Although this Comment is intended to highlight the differences in treatment of private
citizens and celebrities under privacy and publicity rights, the more concentrated focus of this
particular section of the analysis is to demonstrate the sweeping range of the "newsworthiness"
exception to right of privacy claims. As such, Ms. Collins's notoriety, while relevant, is incidental
for the purpose of this case illustration.
55. Lerman, 745 F.2d at 127. In one photograph the woman was topless and in the other she
was engaged in an orgy. Id.
56. 574 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
57. Beauty and the Badge, PLAYBOY, May 1982, at 165.
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Mosler Safe Co.58 The Flores court held that the defendant's use of a
newspaper article, which featured the plaintiff59 as part of an adver-
tisement for the defendant's safes, violated the plaintiff's right of pri-
vacy because the use qualified as a "solicitation for patronage. '60 In
Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc.,61 the plaintiff recovered for the un-
authorized use of his picture in a brochure advertising the sale of his-
torical books because the brochure constituted a solicitation for a
commercial transaction. 62 The Tellado court specifically pointed out
that, had the publication appeared in the books and not the brochure,
there would be no violation of the plaintiff's right of privacy. 63 In
Beverley v. Choices Women's Medical Center, Inc.,64 the court held
that a promotional calendar distributed by a nonprofit family planning
center constituted a "solicitation for patronage" and, thus, the unau-
thorized use of the plaintiff's photograph 65 in such a calendar consti-
tuted an invasion of privacy.66 The court in Beverley specifically noted
that an "advertising message in the cloak of public interest" cannot
escape liability for the invasion of privacy under the First Amendment
protection for "newsworthy" publications.67 These cases demonstrate
that the privacy plaintiff can prevail when the use of identity is in con-
nection with a publication that is overwhelmingly commercial in its
nature and purpose.
C. Personal Privacy Right Waived by the Celebrity as a
Public Figure
Invasion of privacy through misappropriation of identity focuses
primarily on the personal interest of the individual, protecting against
injury to an individual's emotional well-being.68 For instance, in Co-
58. 164 N.E.2d 853 (N.Y. 1959).
59. The newspaper article and photograph depicted the plaintiff in an incident in which the
plaintiff and an acquaintance accidentally set fire to a building by lighting matches in order to
find a pair of lost keys in the dark. Id. at 854.
60. Id. at 857.
61. 643 F. Supp. 904 (D.N.J. 1986).
62. The picture depicted the plaintiff twenty years earlier, fighting in the Vietnam war. Id. at
914.
63. Id.
64. 587 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1991).
65. The calendar included a photograph of the plaintiff, who was totally unaffiliated with the
organization, and in the caption included both her name and her professional title. Id. at 277.
66. Id. at 278.
67. Id. at 279.
68. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 449 (N.Y. 1902) (Gray, J., dis-
senting) ("[Tihe conspicuous display of her likeness ... has so humiliated [plaintiff] . . .as to
cause her distress and suffering, in body and mind.").
1256 [Vol. 53:1247
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hen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc. ,69 a picture of the plaintiffs (a mother and
her four-year-old daughter) bathing nude was featured in an adver-
tisement for the defendant's cellulite removal product.70 The court
denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Cohen
court found that, although the photograph featured only the back side
of the plaintiffs' figures, there were sufficiently identifiable details to
sustain the plaintiffs' cause of action.71 Even though the public at
large would not likely identify the plaintiffs, the feelings of embarrass-
ment constituted a legally cognizable injury and sustained a cause of
action against the defendants.72 Case law in this area continuously
reflects the narrow purpose of this cause of action-to protect the per-
sonal and emotional interests of individuals against the unauthorized
use of their identity for commercial purposes.73
Since the establishment of the right of privacy under common law,
courts have recognized that, in certain instances, privacy rights may be
unprotected because either the individual waived protection under
this right, or the rights of the public or others necessarily prevail.74
Because the basis of a right of privacy was injury to feelings, early
courts denied relief to well-known personalities whose celebrity pre-
cluded injury to solitude.75 For instance, in O'Brien v. Pabst Sales
Co.,76 a well-known football player was denied his claim under inva-
sion of privacy for use of his photograph in a calendar advertising the
defendant's beer. The O'Brien court held that the "publicity he got
was only that which he had been constantly seeking and receiving" 77
69. 472 N.E.2d 307 (N.Y. 1984).
70. Id. at 308.
71. Id. at 310.
72. Id.
73. See., e.g., Miller v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 28 N.Y.S.2d 811, 812-13 (App. Div.
1941) (denying the plaintiff, the last of the "pony express," his invasion of privacy claim for the
use of his picture on a sports program for failure to state an actual injury and, contrarily, testify-
ing that "the use of his name and picture by defendant had not subjected him to any ridicule nor
caused him any humiliation whatever"); see also Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 291
P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (holding that plaintiff adequately stated a material injury to
his "peace of mind"); Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y.1983)
(identifying the primary purpose of the right of privacy as protecting the feelings of the "little
man").
74. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 72 (Ga. 1905); see also Gautier v.
Pro-Football, Inc. 107 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. 1952).
75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995) ("Classification
of the tort as an aspect of the right of privacy, however, led some courts to deny relief to well-
known personalities whose celebrity precluded the allegations of injury to solitude or personal
feelings normally associated with an invasion of privacy.").
76. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
77. Id. at 170.
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and denied his claim against personal, emotional harm.78 Other
courts agreed that celebrities, by the public nature of their personas,
were not entitled to protection under the appropriation prong79 of the
invasion of privacy tort. This tort protects emotional interests of the
private individual who, unlike the celebrity, opts to enjoy life outside
of the public spotlight8 0
In Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc.,81 an individual who performed a
half-time show for an audience of over 35,000 did not succeed under
the right of privacy in an action against the unauthorized rebroadcast
of that performance. 82 Still, the concurring opinion in Gautier recog-
nized that the exclusion of public personas from the right of privacy
leaves unprotected an important economic interest. 83 This important
economic interest, unprotected by the invasion of privacy tort, is now
protected under the "right of publicity."
D. The Right of Publicity is Born
Official recognition of the common law right of publicity emerged
in 1953 when the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit held that famous persons have the right to protection against the
unauthorized use of their name and likeness existing independently
78. Id. The court stated:
Throughout the pleadings, the record and the brief, plaintiff has uniformly taken the
position that he is not suing for the reasonable value of his endorsement of beer, on
the contrary, the whole burden of his pleading and brief is the repeated asseveration,
that he would not and did not endorse beer, and the complaint is that he was damaged
by the invasion of his privacy in so using his picture as to create the impression that he
was endorsing beer.
Id. at 170.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
80. See Nimmer, supra note 21, at 204-06; Madow, supra note 23, at 169; Paramount Pictures,
Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D. Okla. 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 106 F.2d
229 (10th Cir. 1939) (holding that movie star plaintiff could not claim that posters of her consti-
tuted an invasion of privacy); Pallas v. Crowley-Milner & Co., 54 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Mich. 1952)
(denying showgirl/model plaintiff's claim of invasion of privacy for the unauthorized use of her
face in a newspaper advertisement for cosmetics where the court found it relevant to consider
whether the plaintiff "abandoned her strictly private character and waived to any extent the
right to absolute privacy").
81. 107 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. 1952).
82. Id. at 489.
83. Id. at 489 (Desmond, J., concurring). The Court stated:
[Plaintiff's] grievance here is not the invasion of his "privacy" - privacy is the one thing
he did not want, or need, in his occupation. His real complaint, and perhaps a justified
one, but one we cannot redress in this suit brought under the New York "Right of
Privacy" statutes, is that he was not paid for the telecasting of his show." Id. at 489.
Id. See also Nimmer, supra note 21, at 205 (discussing Judge Desmond's opinion and agreeing
that surrender of privacy as a performer should not equate surrender of control of profits de-
rived from that performance).
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from the right of privacy.84 In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.,85 the plaintiff gum manufacturer entered into a
contract with a major league baseball player granting the manufac-
turer the exclusive right to use the player's photograph in connection
with gum sales. 86 The defendant was a competing manufacturer that
then used the same player's image in the promotion of its own gum. 87
The defendants claimed that the contract only prevented the ball
player from suing the original contracting manufacturer for invasion
of privacy, yet did not allow the originally contracting gum manufac-
turer to sue a third party.88 Judge Jerome Frank, writing for the ma-
jority, declared that the baseball player had a "right in the publicity
value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege
of publishing his picture." 89 The court held that this right was inde-
pendent of the player's right of privacy. 90 The next year, Professor
Nimmer published an article advocating recognition of this right as a
necessary protection against unauthorized appropriation of the eco-
nomic value of an individual's likeness.9' The existence of this right
was further validated by its inclusion in the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition.92
E. The Modern Right of Publicity
Today, the right of publicity exists in approximately twenty-eight
states.93 Some states recognize the right of publicity at common law,9 4
84. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
85. Id. at 866.
86. Id. at 867.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 868.
89. Id.
90. Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868.
91. See Nimmer, supra note 21.
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995):
One who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by using without
consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is
subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stated in §§ 48 and 49.
Id.
93. It is difficult to state the exact number of states which recognizing a "right of publicity"
per se. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, stating:
Sometimes [the right of publicity] is simply lumped together with privacy rights, some-
times it is referred to as "unfair competition," and sometimes a court said it didn't
matter what the lable was, it was the law.
Id. § 414.
94. Id. (listing Arizona, Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and
Wisconsin).
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and some recognize the right explicitly in publicity statutes. 95 Other
states,96 such as New York, recognize the right of publicity inclusively
within the context of the right of privacy. 97 Governance of the right of
publicity under state law finds both support 98 and opposition, as many
advocate federal statutory protection of this right.99 Protection has
been recognized under the right of publicity for a wide gambit of per-
sonal attributes, from name and likeness, 1°° to voice,10' phrases,10 2
nicknames, 10 3 and look-alikes.10 4 The Second Circuit recognized elec-
tronic look-alikes as elements of persona protectible under the right
of publicity; the actors who played Norm and Cliff on Cheers'0 5 and
Vanna White of Wheel of Fortune'0 6 recovered under the right of pub-
licity within this context, in two important cases that will be addressed
in further detail below.10 7
95. Id. § 6:4 (listing California, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennes-
see, Texas, and Washington).
96. Id. § 6:8 (listing Florida, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, Rhode Island, Utah, Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin).
97. NEW YORK CIVIL RIGHrs LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinnley 2000). See generally Tara B.
Molrooney, Note, A Critical Examination of New York's Right of Publicity Claim, 74 ST. JOHN'S
L. Rav. 1139 (2000).
98. See generally Usha Rodrigues, Note, Race to the Stars: A Federalism Argument for Leaving
the Right of Publicity in the Hands of the States, 87 VA. L. REV. 1201 (2001) (arguing that intro-
duction of this right would be premature given the number of states who have yet to adopt the
right and the possibility of a workable state-based system).
99. See generally Richard S. Robinson, Preemption, the Right of Publicity, and a New Federal
Statute, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & Er. L.J. 183, 202-07 (1998) (advocating the introduction of a
federal publicity statute to eliminate preemption, split circuits, and conflict of law problems and
to promote predictability); see also Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a
Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 227 (1999).
100. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
101. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). Singer Bette Midler
succeeded in a right of publicity claim against Ford Motor Co., which used a "sound-alike" to
imitate the singer in its commercial. Id. See also Waitts v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.
1992). Singer Tom Waitts succeeded in his publicity claim against defendant for using a "sound-
alike" to imitate the singer in a chip commercial. Id.
102. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
Comedian Johnny Carson recovered against defendant corporation under the right of publicity
for use of the phrases "Here's Johhny" and "The World's Foremost Comedian," which the court
found to be included as part of Carson's identity. Id.
103. See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979). Plaintiff, a football
player known commonly by his nickname "Crazylegs" was able to recover under the right of
publicity against the defendant for use of that name in connection with the defendant's line of
disposable razors. Id.
104. See Onassis v. Christian Dior, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Spec. Term. 1984) (holding that the
right of publicity protected the plaintiff, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, from the use of a look-
alike model intended to invoke her image in the defendant's fashion advertisement).
105. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999).
106. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
107. See infra notes 172-181 and accompanying text.
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The right of publicity has been broadly interpreted and expanded.
Some states have recognized that the right of publicity is descendi-
ble. 10 8 Successors to the publicity rights of famous persons such as the
actors who played The Three Stooges,10 9 the Marx Brothers,110 and
Elvis Presley,"' enforced claims against unauthorized use of the iden-
tity of these celebrities. Indeed, the right of publicity has received
broad recognition in both statutory and common law.
The right of publicity emerged in modern law as a vitally important
legal interest, particularly to those whose image constitutes a coveted
marketable commodity. Since its introduction into the modern legal
system, countless celebrities have asserted this claim against the unau-
thorized use of identity. While some individuals such as Jacqueline
Onassis, 12 Cary Grant,11 3 Mohammad Ali,114 and Clint Eastwood' a5
defeated the free speech assertions brought in defense against such
claims, other famous persons, such as Dustin Hoffman,' 1 6 were unable
to defeat the First Amendment when claiming right of publicity viola-
tions. Civil rights icon Rosa Parks is currently challenging the unau-
thorized use of her name as the title of a rap song as a violation of her
right of publicity against the artists' First Amendment defense. 11 7
The roots of the right of privacy and the right of publicity are inter-
twined, yet through this lineage, two distinct causes of action have
emerged in American jurisprudence. Given the powerful role of the
media and instant accessibility of images through modern technology,
the right of publicity, as well as the right of privacy, should be reas-
sessed to ensure that the burdens endured and the protections re-
ceived under the First Amendment are properly accorded to all.
III. ANALYSIS
As discussed in the preceding section, private citizens asserting
claims under the misappropriation of identity tort must assert a per-
sonal emotional harm. Celebrities, having "waived" this personal
108. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 9:18 (listing California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington).
109. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
110. See Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
111. See Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
112. See Onassis v. Christian Dior Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Spec. Term.1984).
113. See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
114. See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
115. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983).
116. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
117. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
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emotional interest in privacy, must assert an economic harm under the
right of publicity." 8 Yet in claims of both privacy and publicity rights,
the issue is not only the purpose for which the right is invoked, but
also the use to which the identity is put. 119 Oftentimes, the use at
issue is a hybrid of both commercial and expressive elements. 120
While both rights relate to the "commercial" use of the plaintiff's
identity, courts employ different interpretations of what constitutes an
actionable commercial use when looking at these two independent
rights.
Courts seem to favor a broader interpretation of "commercial"
speech when evaluating right of publicity claims, whereas broader def-
erence to the First Amendment is granted in invasion of privacy
claims under the "newsworthiness" defense.1 21 In a right of publicity
context, courts have attempted to establish clear guidelines for apply-
ing a balancing approach to determine what constitutes a "commer-
cial" use in publicity claims. It is established that explicitly
commercial speech is undeserving of First Amendment protection
against a right of publicity claim. Still, courts seem to broaden the
scope of what constitutes commercial speech beyond the established
minimum that when the "message is 'buy' the content is labeled 'com-
mercial' "122 when assessing claims brought under the right of public-
ity. This is problematic for two reasons: 1) this may pose a direct
threat to cultural parody; and 2) there may be a legal distinction being
drawn inadvertently based on the status of the individual asserting a
claim.
This section will discuss three concerns raised in considering public-
ity and privacy law in modern American culture: 1) that the overriding
societal interest in freedom of expression often eclipses genuine and
compelling personal privacy interests asserted by private individuals;
2) the comparatively expansive parameters of the right of publicity as
it is primarily applicable to celebrities; and 3) the resultant danger of
disparate treatment of similar claims on the basis of fame. Explora-
tion into each of these issues addresses the difficulties and peculiari-
118. See Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real
People in the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1588 (1979) (discussing the contradictory nature of the
word "privacy" when applied to claims brought by famous persons).
119. See Kahn, supra note 16, at 221.
120. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of Con-
structed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. ILL.
L. REV. 151. 152 ("Such uses include situations that involve a mixture of commercial and politi-
cal, informational, entertainment, or other expressive components.").
121. See infra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
122. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 8:17.
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ties of this important amalgam of privacy, property, and constitutional
law.
A. The Right of Privacy: Bearing the Burden of the
First Amendment
There is an inherent conflict between the right of privacy and the
First Amendment, as the right of privacy directly impinges upon the
free dissemination of ideas. Particularly in regard to news publica-
tions, the First Amendment freedom of the press has been given
weighty deference in right of privacy claims.123 Corollary to the rever-
ence in American law and culture of the freedom of the press is the
established principle that commercial speech is entitled to minimal
First Amendment protection.12 4 It is the differentiation between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech that creates the hurdle for individ-
uals asserting both privacy and publicity claims. Courts have broadly
and, at times, inconsistently construed the parameters of what consti-
tutes a "commercial" use when applied to the identity of celebrities,
whose fame generally guarantees that unjust enrichment occurs when-
ever and wherever the costly authorization for use of their well-known
identity has not been obtained.1 25 However, private individuals can-
not always establish the requisite unjust enrichment. 126 Pursuant to
the deference to "newsworthy" uses in assessing right of privacy
claims, individuals who assert such claims often must endure personal
and emotional detriment that yields only negligible social benefit.
1. The Right of Publicity Escapes the Newsworthiness Exception
The defining distinction between privacy and publicity claims is that
the right of publicity protects a proprietary and not a personal interest
123. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1967) (analyzing a claim of false light inva-
sion of privacy). Footnote 5 of the Court's opinion cites twenty-two cases in which the right of
privacy was defeated by the overriding interest in freedom of the press. at 383 n.5.
124. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980).
125. See infra notes 160-181 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984). In this case, a
photograph of the plaintiff, created by use of special effects to appear as though he was shooting
himself through the head, was featured in the defendant's magazine publication. The court de-
nied the plaintiff in his common law right of publicity claim for failure to establish that the use
served a commercial purpose. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the right of pub-
licity "means in essence that the reaction of the public to name and likeness, which may be
fortuitous or which may be managed or planned, endows the name and likeness of the person
involved with commercially exploitable opportunities." Id. at 530 (quoting Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court, although
basing its finding on the non-commercial purpose of the use, additionally found that the reaction
of the public to the plaintiff's likeness does not endow him with commercially exploitable oppor-
tunities, the "essence" of the right of publicity. Id. (quoting Lugosi, 603 P.2d. at 431).
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in one's identity, protecting against economic but not emotional
harm.127 This is the core explanation for the disparate treatment of
celebrities and noncelebrities asserting unauthorized commercial use
of identity. This rationale supports the transferability and
descendibility rights recognized in statutes and common law.12 8 The
discussion of cases in the previous section involved private individuals
asserting claims under the right of privacy who were unable to defeat
the broad scope of the "newsworthiness" exception. Each of the uses
of identity at issue in these cases was published in a periodical. The
case of Eastwood v. National Enquirer, Inc. 129 illustrates how an oppo-
site result can be achieved when a celebrity plaintiff brings a right of
publicity claim for the use of identity within this same context of news
or public interest-related publications.
In Eastwood, popular film star Clint Eastwood brought suit against
the defendant publishing corporation for violation of his right of
publicity. The magazine had used Eastwood's name and likeness on
the cover of a publication and in telecast advertisements promoting a
nondefamatory article of which he was the subject. 130 The court held
that the use constituted commercial exploitation and was not entitled
to First Amendment protection.13' Specifically, the Eastwood court
based its determination on "a weighing of the private interest of the
right of publicity against matters of public interest calling for constitu-
tional protection, and a consideration of the character of these com-
peting interests."'1 32 The court's weighing of Mr. Eastwood's publicity
interest is clearly distinguishable from the stringently applied First
Amendment exception for all newsworthy publications discussed in
the aforementioned privacy cases. This case suggests that the celeb-
rity who asserts a claim of unjust enrichment under the right of public-
ity has more leverage in prevailing against the conflicting First
Amendment interest than a private individual who can only defeat a
free speech defense if he or she suffers a personal injury due to a
wholly commercial use of identity.
127. See Kwall, supra note 10, at 197. As Professor Kwall explains:
the right of privacy has served as a means of compensating an individual for injured
feelings caused by the defendant's conduct. In the typical right of publicity action, how-
ever, the plaintiff is not objecting primarily to the fact of the exploitation, but rather to
the loss of financial gain associated with the unauthorized appropriation.
Id.
128. See infra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
129. 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983).
130. Id. at 344.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 349-50.
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As stated by the court in Arrington, "an inability to vindicate a per-
sonal predilection for privacy may be part of the price every person
must pay for a society in which information and opinion flow
freely. '133 While it is evident that the average individual living in
modern society must bear some of the intrusion of overriding free
speech interests, the ability of Mr. Eastwood to defeat this principle,
and the liberal protection afforded to the use of noncelebrity images
discussed above suggests that the well-known and the anonymous do
not equally share this "price."
2. The Necessary Evil of the "Reasonable Relationship" Standard
Private individuals face a more daunting task when the absence of
commercial value in their persona precludes the possibility of success
under the right of publicity. Specifically, the "reasonable relation-
ship" standard for determining whether the use of a photograph in
connection with a publication qualifies as "newsworthy" is problem-
atic for unsuspecting private citizens. In Arrington,134 Mr. Arrington
found the content of the article to which his photograph was attached
insulting and degrading not only to black persons of middle class sta-
tus, but to himself in particular. 135 He expressly disagreed with the
ideas espoused in the article discussing the role of the expanding black
middle class that stated, "[T]his group has been growing more re-
moved from its less fortunate brethren.1 36 He also suffered signifi-
cant emotional injury as he was the subject of scorn and ridicule by
others who assumed his endorsement of the article by virtue of the
associated photograph. 137 Still, because a reasonable relationship ex-
isted between Mr. Arrington's picture and the subject of the article,
the article itself was not "an advertisement in disguise," and therefore
the court would not sustain a claim for invasion of privacy. 138
Similarly situated to Mr. Arrington were the plaintiffs in Jackson v.
Playboy Enterprises, Inc.139 Like Mr. Arrington, these three minor
boys were unaware that their presence outside the private domain of
their home would subject them to publication of their picture without
their authorization, much less in a pornographic magazine. The Jack-
son court held that the plaintiffs could not state a valid claim of inva-
sion of privacy under Ohio law without showing that the defendant
133. Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1323 (N.Y. 1982).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1320.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1322.
139. 574 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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appropriated for its own benefit some value contained in the plain-
tiffs' identity.140 Because the three young boys in Jackson could not
demonstrate that their likenesses were intrinsically valuable, the use
was considered "incidental" and recovery was denied. 141 The boys'
assertions that they were "humiliated, annoyed, disgraced [and] ex-
posed to public contempt and ridicule" could not overcome the coun-
tervailing interest in free speech. 142
Mr. Arrington was publicly associated with an article that espoused
a particular political and social commentary which, as the subject of
the attached photograph, he opposed. 143 The three minor boys in
Jackson were featured in a pornographic magazine, a specific genre of
publications to which neither these boys, nor presumably their par-
ents, wished to be affiliated. 144 These cases demonstrate the poten-
tially devastating effects that may befall those who endure uninvited
notoriety through no intentional actions of their own. The plaintiffs in
both Arrington and Jackson had no connection to the articles to which
their identities were affixed, other than a tangential link to the sub-
jects of the articles. While the reputational injury to the individual is a
sacrifice the law is willing to impose for the price of free speech, in
some instances this principle is unsettling to a personal sense of pri-
vacy, anonymity, and control over public affiliation.
Indeed, the idea that one can encounter such a fate simply by virtue
of being in the wrong place at the wrong time and appropriately fitting
the desired visual accompaniment to a publication or other fixed ex-
pression that another individual wishes to create, has dangerous impli-
cations in this day of mass communication. The visual age has
spawned an entire industry from the consumer demand for captured
moments of actual human activity. 145 Although the modern cultural
fascination with fame manifests itself both inwardly and outwardly, in
that many members of society are not only obsessed with popular cul-
ture icons but themselves desire to experience the spotlight of public
notoriety, 46 it is undeniable that many individuals shun the voyeuris-
tic eye of the camera.
140. Id. at 13.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Arrington, 434 N.E.2d at 1322-23.
144. Jackson, 574 F. Supp. at 11.
145. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
146. Evidence to this proposition is provided to the ceaseless influx of individuals who not
only volunteer but in many instances compete for the opportunity to appear on television reality
programs and daytime panel shows.
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For instance, it is possible to imagine a scenario in which an individ-
ual, a postadolescent, young-adult female could find a photograph of
herself taken while vacationing on spring break published in connec-
tion with an article discussing the lucrative industry that has evolved
from the mass marketing of amateur home movies depicting young
college-age women in various stages of undress or engaged in sexually
explicit activities. 147 Assume, for purposes of this illustration, that this
is a cultural phenomenon in which she has never participated and
from which she is otherwise entirely detached. Given the modicum of
circumstances associating her to those individuals who are involved in
the practices described in the article, (namely her age and her pres-
ence in the vacation atmosphere wherein these occurrences take
place) her photograph would have a reasonable relationship to a
newsworthy publication. That is, if this hypothetical expos6 specifi-
cally discussed the trend amongst this particular demographic to
which this girl belongs, to engage in such activities while on spring
break, there would be a reasonable relationship between the girl and
the article such that she could not maintain a claim under the right of
privacy. As discussed in detail above, when there is an arguable news-
worthy or public interest purpose involved with the use of the identity
of an individual who is peripherally connected to the subject of the
publication, freedom of speech will likely prevail.
In fact, at least one court has held that a young woman who was
actually featured in one such video and the commercial advertising its
sale, without authorization, could not assert a right of publicity claim.
In Lane v. Holdings, LLC,14 a young woman who was featured ex-
posing herself in the video Girls Gone Wild149 and in paid television
commercials advertising the video 150 brought suit against the film
makers and distributors alleging inter alia violation of her common
law right to privacy, as well as her statutory right under Florida law
against unauthorized publication of name and likeness. 51 The court
granted summary judgment for the defendants on both claims, holding
147. The model business upon which this hypothetical is based is the extensively advertised
video series Girls Gone Wild. The subject of this collection of movies, sold via phone orders and
advertised during late night commercials, is the candid sexually explicit behaviors of young col-
lege girls while vacationing, spontaneously filmed in the style of amateur home video. The girls
are advertised as "real" in that they are not paid actresses, the implication being that their ac-
tions are a product of their own volition and not any pre-designed plot or script. These movies
have gained substantial notoriety in pop culture, both for the significant success they have at-
tained within their own market, and for the attention and commentary they have provoked.
148. 242 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
149. See supra note 147.
150. Lane v. MRA Holdings, LLC, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1210 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
151. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 2003).
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that "as a matter of law [the plaintiff's] image and likeness were not
used to directly promote a product or service.' 52 The court based its
reasoning on the fact that Girls Gone Wild was an expressive work
and that, while the girl's image and likeness were used to sell the
work, they were never associated with a product or service unrelated
to that work.153 It is also significant that the district court determined
that the young girl "voluntarily participated" in the acts she per-
formed in the film and commercial, 54 despite the plaintiff's allegation
that the defendants fraudulently misled her into participating. 155 Still,
the uneasy distinction between what is sufficiently "commercial" to
invoke the right of privacy and what constitutes a permissible non-
commercial use is evident, particularly when the young girl's image is
featured in an actual television "commercial."
In addition to the limited definition of "commercial" use in right of
privacy cases, the other element of the fourth prong of invasion of
privacy, "benefit to the defendant," is likewise narrowly construed. In
granting weighty deference to "newsworthy" uses of an individual's
identity, courts narrowly interpret the "commercial use" or "defen-
dant's advantage"' 56 element of the misappropriation tort to mean a
direct benefit resulting from an invitation to make a commercial trans-
action.' 57 Any revenue the publication generates as a whole is irrele-
vant in determining whether the use was commercial for the purpose
of finding a violation of the right of privacy by misappropriation of
identity. The value of the identity, as compliment to the underlying
message, is not taken into account. Although there is a profit being
made at some level, individuals who seek vindication of their right of
privacy cannot affect recovery without a showing that the sole purpose
of the alleged use was to sell a product. 58 While the rationale for the
deference to free speech is valid,159 the result is that those who publish
and otherwise create anything of arguable public interest or news-
worthy quality are allowed to use an individual's identity in connec-
tion with such a publication, without permission or compensation.
152. Lane, 242 F. Supp.2d at 1213
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 489.
156. See PROSSER, supra note 35, at 389.
157. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
158. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) ("Profit motive alone does not
make speech less protected.").
159. But see Kahn, supra note 16, at 258. Kahn argues that the inquiry does not necessarily
need to involve an analysis of free speech; in dealing with misappropriation, newsworthy speech
is upheld not because it constitutes an overriding free speech issue, but because, by definition, it
is not the commercialization of the plaintiff's identity, which is the sole issue under this tort. Id.
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B. Expansive Publicity Rights Triumph Over the First Amendment
The competing interest preventing the unauthorized use of identity
and the free dissemination of information is evaluated differently
when claims are based on violations to the economic value of a per-
sona implicated by the right of publicity than when evaluated under
privacy claims. While the exception for "newsworthiness" still applies
in right of publicity cases, 16° at times publicity claims have been suc-
cessful in cases in which a substantial newsworthy or other free speech
interest has been advanced. Specifically, works using celebrity per-
sonas that could reasonably be deemed "expressive" have been de-
nied free speech protection when the associative value of celebrity
image derives a commercial benefit. 161 There are various explana-
tions for this trend in publicity cases. 162 A look at the judicial meth-
ods employed in determining whether a use of identity is sufficiently
commercial to sustain a right of publicity cause of action compared to
those employed in privacy claims will illuminate the implications of
excluding private individuals from protection under the right of pub-
licity and will introduce the correlation between this right and modern
American culture.
1. Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc.
As mentioned in the previous section, successors to the publicity
rights of the late comedy trio, the Three Stooges, succeeded in a right
of publicity claim for the unauthorized use of the Three Stooges'
images in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc. 163 The Com-
edy III court employed the following two-pronged analysis to deter-
mine whether the defendant's use of the late celebrities' images on t-
shirts violated their right of publicity: 1) if the use in question in-
volves no significant transformative elements to the identity of the
plaintiff; or 2) if the value of the work derives primarily from the fame
of the plaintiff, the First Amendment interest will be defeated by the
160. See Ann-Margaret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (deny-
ing recovery to actress Ann-Margaret for invasion of her right of publicity for use of her image in
a "newsworthy" publication); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th
Cir. 1992) (denying plaintiffs, a well-known musical group, their claim of commercial and com-
mon law misappropriation of identity for use of their name in two newspaper publications in
promotion of a telephone poll).
161. See supra notes 163-181 and accompanying text.
162. See Fletcher & Rubin, supra note 118, at 1606 (arguing the failure of privacy and public-
ity claims stems from the inadequate confrontation of the First Amendment, and the unsound
reasoning employed in determining a legal conclusion that these rights exist, but not a clear legal
explanation for why they exist).
163. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
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plaintiff's proprietary interest in his or her right of publicity. 164 Be-
cause the use of the image of the late Three Stooges on the t-shirts
was not transformative and derived its value primarily from the fame
of the celebrities, 165 the Comedy III court held that the defendant had
violated the plaintiff's right of publicity. As such, the defendants vio-
lated the right of publicity even though the court expressly declared
the character of the use as "expressive." 166
According to the Comedy III court,
when artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imi-
tation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on the
right of publicity without adding significant expression beyond that
trespass, the state law interest in protecting the fruits of artistic la-
bor outweighs the expressive interests of the imitative artist.167
As such, expressive use of identity constitutes commercial speech, not
entitled to First Amendment protection, if it is deemed nontrans-
formative. This standard is significantly less stringent than the "solici-
tation for patronage" standard in claims of invasion of privacy. Each
of the failed privacy claims discussed above involved a literal depic-
tion of the aggrieved plaintiff. Whereas the burden is on the plaintiff
in the right of privacy case to demonstrate that the identity is used in
connection with a proposed transaction, in right of publicity cases, the
burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the expressive use of
the identity is sufficiently transformative.
2. Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen
The successors of Elvis Presley's publicity rights brought a success-
ful right of publicity claim against the producer of a stage show featur-
ing an Elvis impersonator in Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen.168 The
court held that the defendant's performance lacked the requisite crea-
tivity to make the work transformative and the plaintiffs were there-
fore entitled to compensation for the unauthorized use of identity. 169
The court held that "although [the show] contains an informational
and entertainment element, the show serves primarily to commercially
exploit the likeness of Elvis Presley without contributing anything of
substantial value to society. ' 170 The expressive work of the defen-
dant, which certainly would have qualified for First Amendment pro-
164. Id. at 801.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 802.
167. Id. at 809.
168. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
169. Id. at 1359.
170. Id.
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tection against a claim of invasion of privacy, did not withstand the
judicial test applied to the right of publicity.
The notion that impersonation of a deceased entertainer who was
and is undeniably one of the most revered performers in American
history could be precluded without financial compensation to the suc-
cessors of that individual's publicity rights is troubling on several
levels. Not only does this result suffocate legitimate and significant
artistic expression, it does so solely for the economic benefit and pro-
tection of persons whose only claim to the identity is derived from a
testamentary transfer of economic interest. The protection of these
interests seems less imperative than promoting important forms of so-
cial commentary and artistic expression such as parody. As Professor
Michael Madow states, "[t]he traditional presumption in favor of free
appropriability of intangibles rests in part on the widespread sense
that progress in all spheres of human activity-science, business, art-
depends on imitation, and thus requires that people be largely left free
to 'reap' where others have 'sown."' 171
3. White v. Samsung Electronics, Inc. and Wendt v. Host
International, Inc.
Two right of publicity cases mentioned earlier, which strike at the
very chord of this tension between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment, have attracted considerable attention and commentary
for their controversial results. In these cases, courts extended protec-
tion under the right of publicity to electronic look-alikes. In White v.
Samsung Electronics, Inc.,172 the offending use involved an electronic
robot clad in a blonde wig and turning over letters on a game board
resembling that used in the popular game show, Wheel of Fortune.173
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
this use violated Vanna White's common law right of publicity.1 74 The
court placed little value in the speech, denying the use protection as
an expressive work of parody, holding: "the ad's spoof of Vanna
White and Wheel of Fortune is subservient and only tangentially re-
lated to the ad's primary message: 'buy Samsung VCRs."1 75
In dissent, Judge Alex Kozinski argued that this expansive scope of
the right of publicity and failure to accord protection under the First
Amendment to this use of identity has dangerous implications for
171. Madow, supra note 23, at 201.
172. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
173. Id. at 1396.
174. Id. at 1399.
175. Id. at 1401.
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both law and society. 176 He wrote: "[T]he effect of the majority's
holding on expressive conduct is difficult to estimate. The majority's
position seems to allow any famous person or entity to bring suit
based on any commercial advertisement that depicts a character or
role performed by the plaintiff."'1 77 The dissenting opinion reflects a
legitimate concern that broad interpretation of "commercial" ex-
ploitation of identity will have a damaging impact on the freedom of
expression.
In Wendt v. Host International, Inc.,178 a proprietor of a chain of
airport bars, modeled after the set of the television series Cheers, fea-
tured animatronic figurines intended to resemble the characters
"Norm" and "Cliff" from the popular television sitcom. As in White,
the Ninth Circuit trivialized the expressive value of the speech and
characterized the evocation of the actors' identities as commercial ex-
ploitation. 179 Again, Judge Kozinski provided an ardent dissent, advo-
cating the countervailing interest of free speech. 180 Judge Kozinski
characterized the use as "expressive" and maintained that the over-
reach of the right of publicity in impinging on the First Amendment is
an undesirable and dangerous application. 181
Each of the cases discussed above demonstrates how an overbroad
interpretation of the right of publicity can stifle legitimate and impor-
tant forms of expression. Incorporation of pop culture into personal
expression has been used as a form of social commentary throughout
time. To allow individuals and entities to exert excessive control over
the use of identity whenever a viable economic loss can be established
has dangerous First Amendment implications and must be narrowly
and consistently construed.
C. The Right of Publicity Plaintiff. Theory Versus Practice
Given the different criterion for establishing a "commercial" use,
private individuals asserting a claim against the unauthorized use of
their identities for the defendant's commercial purposes are at a sig-
nificant disadvantage because they will have to establish an "exclu-
sively commercial" use in order to succeed in their claims. First
Amendment protection is more readily granted to "newsworthy" or
176. Id. at 1402-08.
177. Id at 1407.
178. 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999).
179. Id. at 1288.
180. Id. at 1284 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). A petition for rehearing en banc was denied by a
panel of circuit judges.
181. Id. at 1288.
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"public interest" related uses, and the private individual is unlikely to
defeat the First Amendment interests under the right of privacy.
However, the celebrity claiming a right of publicity violation need
only show lack of transformative contribution and unjust enrichment.
Privacy only protects from a personal injury and then only in limited
instances in which the offending user has no viable constitutional ar-
gument. For the aggrieved individual, the right of publicity would
seem to be the more attractive avenue of relief,182 as it encompasses
all aspects of the injury and has a somewhat lesser standard of estab-
lishing "commercial use" so long as unjust enrichment can be
established.
Based on these distinctions, it would seem that the most promising
option for private individuals seeking to recover for the unauthorized
use of their identity would be to bring a cause of action under the
right of publicity. Professor Thomas McCarthy affirms that "even for
the non-celebrity whose identity is used without permission in an ad, it
is usually preferable to use the right of publicity rather than [to assert]
a privacy claim."'1 83 Professor Nimmer specifically declined to "draw a
line" between individuals who have achieved celebrity status and
those who have not,184 and most statutes do not preclude noncelebri-
ties from protection under the right of publicity. 185 The inclusion of
all individuals under the ambit of protection provided by the right of
publicity has found much academic support. Professor Roberta Ro-
senthall Kwall, a proponent of the continuing growth and develop-
ment of the right of publicity, advocates for the concept of a universal
right of publicity plaintiff.186
The inequity lies in the fact that, just as celebrities are generally
precluded from claiming invasion of privacy by misappropriation of
identity, the right of publicity, in practice, is primarily limited to celeb-
rities. 187 In practice, the nature of a right of publicity claim, as an
182. Kwall, supra note 10, at 200 ("[N]o other law affords equal scope of protection against
the unauthorized exploitation of the individual's name and likeness.").
183. See Kahn, supra note 16, at 244 (quoting Joseph McCarthy, The Human Persona as Com-
mercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 134 (1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
184. See Nimmer, supra note 21, at 217.
185. See J. Thomas McCarthy, Public Personas and Private Property: The Commercialization
of Human Identity, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 681, 684 (1989) (labeling the right of publicity "the
inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity").
186. See Kwall, supra note 10, at 200-04.
187. See Arlene W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of Publicity: Wheel Spun
Out of Control, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 329, 339 n.61 (1997) (arguing that "this statutory right of
action is supplemented by a common-law right of publicity that as a practical, if not legal, matter
seems limited to celebrities") (citations omitted); see Halpern, supra note 23, at 1200 n.3.; Eric
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action against unjust enrichment, precludes private individuals from
succeeding absent an economic benefit to an unauthorized user
through use of the identity without compensation to the owner of the
identity. As such, the right of publicity is "peculiarly celebrity based,
arising only in the case of an individual who has attained some degree
of notoriety or fame. ' 188 Although private individuals have recovered
on the theory of a right of publicity,18 9 the overwhelming majority of
right of publicity litigation involves celebrity plaintiffs.190
The unavoidable fact is that it is the commercial value of the celeb-
rity plaintiff's identity that gives rise to the cause of action. 191 Be-
cause average private individuals cannot readily demonstrate that the
defendant's use of their identity derived value from their fame, the
individuals cannot recover. Although there is a presumption of com-
mercial value once it is found that the defendant used the plaintiff's
identity for commercial purpose, 192 courts are reluctant to afford com-
mercial value to the identities of noncelebrities.1 93 The result is that
unjust enrichment persists due to the absence of right of publicity
claims brought by noncelebrities. As discussed in the preceding sec-
H. Reiter, Personality and Patrimony: Comparative Perspectives on the Right to One's Image, 76
TUL. L. REV. 673, 718-19 (2002) ("[W]hile all individuals enjoy a right to privacy, and while
everyone in theory is entitled to the protection of the patrimonial aspects of their personality,
recourse is primarily via privacy for the anonymous, via patrimonial injury for the famous.").
188. See Halpern, supra note 23, at 1200 n.3.
189. See, e.g., Canessa v. J. I. Kislak, 235 A.2d 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1962). The plain-
tiffs recovered for the defendant real estate agent's unauthorized use of a photograph of the
plaintiff's family in an advertisement. The picture was the subject of a newspaper article on the
plaintiffs, who were a large family unable to find a home to rent due to their numbers. After
viewing the print, the defendants helped the family to buy a house. Id. at 64. Although the
plaintiffs did not specifically invoke the right of publicity, it is clear that the claim was for the
failure to compensate the family financially and not for the reprint of the photograph that they
had purposefully participated in for the purpose of gaining exposure for their predicament.
190. See, e.g., Laurel Kallen, Note, Invading the "Homes" of the Homeless: Is Existing Right of
Privacy/Publicity Legislation Adequate?, 19 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 405, 414 (noting that
"non-celebrities file only a small number of right of publicity actions."); Langvardt, supra note
172, at 339 ("[R]ight of publicity cases nearly always involve celebrity plaintiffs.").
191. See Langvardt, supra note 187, at 339. Langvardt stated:
Of the possible reasons for this state of affairs, two stand out. First, many advertisers
and other commercial users may prefer to invoke a celebrity's image rather than that of
a non-celebrity, due to the greater commercial "mileage" to be realized from associa-
tion with a celebrity. Second, the celebrity plaintiff's potential economic stakes are
likely to be higher than those of the non-celebrity plaintiff, thanks to the greater com-
mercial value of the celebrity's name, likeness, or identity. Celebrities thus have greater
opportunity and greater incentive to sue - and they act accordingly.
Id.
192. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 4:17.
193. See Kallen, supra note 190, at 414 n.62 ("[T]he operative assumption in right of publicity
cases is that the commercial value of a non-celebrity's identity would generally be significantly
less than the commercial value of a celebrity's identity.") (citations omitted).
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tion, it is exceedingly difficult to defeat First Amendment assertions in
claiming a violation under the right of privacy in the face of the new-
sworthiness exception. Moreover, at least as a practical matter, the
right of publicity is closed to private individuals. As such, the possibil-
ity of vindication for private individuals whose identity has been used
without their permission is uncertain, and many times unavailable.
It is arguable that the exclusion of noncelebrity plaintiffs from right
of publicity protection is not the only arguable deficiency in the hybrid
of protection of identity created through privacy and publicity rights.
That is, just as private individuals are often denied economic interest
in their identity, celebrity plaintiffs are denied express protection for
their personal emotional rights. 194 As discussed, courts have histori-
cally regarded celebrities' personal emotional interests in their privacy
as a negligible legal concern. The emergence of the right of publicity
was occasioned by the judicial determination that persons who have
pursued fame should not be able to obtain legal recourse for every
unintended or unwanted consequence that may result from that
fame.195 This does, however, raise the issue of those individuals
whose notoriety is of an infamous nature. For example, consider the
tornado of international press resulting in the commercial production
of various commodities surrounding the sex scandal involving a for-
mer United States President and a well-known White House intern.
Would it be fair to say that for at least some of those individuals, their
fame was nothing more than the public spotlight they sought for them-
selves? It is the opinion of this author that a person does not waive a
privacy interest by virtue of having attained fame, whether achieved
or unintentionally begotten.
Still, the fact that the personal rights of celebrities are excluded
from right of privacy protection is of little impact because these per-
sonal emotional interests are frequently subsumed under publicity
rights, and it is often these personal interests, and not the desire for
economic recovery, that motivates celebrity plaintiffs to bring claims
under the right of publicity. 196 For instance, actor Cary Grant recov-
ered for a personal harm under the right of publicity in Grant v. Es-
194. See generally Kahn, supra note 16 (arguing for express recognition of the dignitary inter-
est of celebrities within the right of publicity).
195. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
196. See Kahn, supra note 16, at 264 ("[C]ourts' considerations of privacy-based identity
harms are usually entangled with and largely subsumed by their analyses of the property-based
rights of publicity."); see also Roberta Rosenthall Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First
Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 50 (1994). (arguing that
economic harms are typically far less damaging to celebrities than "non-monetizable" harms
resulting from uses that they would never have condoned).
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quire, Inc.197 Although the actor's purpose in bringing suit was to
vindicate an emotional harm rather than an economic loss, as he as-
serted that he did not want "anyone-himself included-to profit by
the publicity value of his name and reputation,"'198 the court held that
the harm was commercially based and that the actor could be made
whole by the payment of damages. 199 Jacqueline Onassis sued for the
use of a look-alike in advertising the Christian Dior clothing line.200
Because Mrs. Onassis had never used her name or image in the pro-
motion of a commercial product, her purpose was not recovery of lost
economic profit,20 1 evidenced by the fact that she sought only injunc-
tive relief and not monetary damages. Similarly, heavyweight cham-
pion Mohammed Ali brought suit under the right of publicity for the
appearance of a nude drawing of himself in a sexually explicit maga-
zine.202 It is reasonable to assume that Mr. Ali did not bring suit be-
cause of an economic harm suffered in not being paid for the use, but
for the personal harm suffered through his association with a publica-
tion of this nature.
In a more recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment entered against re-
nowned Rosa Parks, civil rights activist who sued the popular group
OutKast under the common law right of publicity for using her name
as the title for one of the group's hip hop songs.203 Ms. Parks, revered
for her influential role in the Montgomery bus boycott and the civil
rights movement in the south, expressed her disapproval of the miso-
gynistic and racial overtones of the song.204 The Parks case demon-
strates the intersection of the foundational principles of both the right
of privacy and the right of publicity; Ms. Parks asserted her personal
interest under her economically based right of publicity.20 5
197. 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
198. Id. at 880.
199. See Kahn, supra note 16, at 235-36.
200. Onassis v. Christian Dior, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Spec. Term. 1984).
201. Id. at 257.
202. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
203. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003). OutKast released a song called
"Rosa Parks" on its album "Aquemini." Id. at 442. The chorus of the popular song alluded to
Ms. Parks legacy for her historical refusal to give up her seat on a Montgomery, Alabama city
bus: "Ah-ha, hush that fuss, everybody move to the back of the bus." Id. at 442.
204. Parks, 329 F.3d at 442. "The same sticker that contained the name Rosa Parks also con-
tained a Parental Advisory warning of 'explicit content."' Id.
205. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court to make a
determination as to whether or not the question of whether Ms. Parks' common law right of
publicity was violated should be made by the trier of fact and not on summary judgment as a
matter of law. Summary judgment on her defamation claim and both her tortious interference
with a business relationship claims was upheld. Id. at 463. Parks, 309 F.3d at 461.
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Each of these cases demonstrates the ability of celebrities, whose
exclusion from protection under the right of privacy prompted the
emergence of the right of publicity, to achieve economic recovery for
the same personal interests that right of privacy courts determined
public figures could not assert. In essence, celebrities, motivated by
dignitary interests and a desire to vindicate the integrity of their iden-
tity, are able to effect this vindication by virtue of the economic value
of their identity and the courts' desire to prevent unjust enrichment. 20 6
Indeed, the prevention of unjust enrichment is a noble legal pursuit.
However, while the dignitary interests involved in the right of privacy
are subsumed in celebrity right of publicity claims,20 7 unjust enrich-
ment interests are not subsumed under privacy claims. Even if they
were, such claims are exceedingly difficult to sustain in a world of
mass media and broad deference to the First Amendment. Personal
interests are subsumed under publicity claims, allowing for redress of
both economic and personal injury.2°8 The scope of this right expands
to protect the whole individual, as a marketable commodity and as an
autonomous entity, in control of his or her own public depiction. The
difficulty a private individual has in succeeding in an economically
based claim brought under the right of publicity has led to disparate
treatment of claims brought for essentially the same interest.
IV. IMPACT
The Supreme Court of California articulated the inherent conflict
between individual privacy and freedom of speech, stating, "In a na-
tion built upon the free dissemination of ideas, it is always difficult to
declare that something may not be published." 20 9 Indeed, free speech
interests provide a strong countervailing interest to the enforcement
of the right of privacy. 210 While the unrestricted dissemination of
206. See Kahn, supra note 16, at 214.
207. See Kahn, supra note 16, at 264.
208. Id. at 214.
209. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 42 (Cal. 1971). This case dealt with a
claim dealing with the "false light" element of the invasion of privacy. The plaintiff in this case,
whose picture connected with a hijacking incident that had occurred eleven years earlier was
published in a newspaper, had stated a valid cause of action under the false light invasion of
privacy tort. Id.
210. See generally FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN PERSPECTIVE (2001) (warning of the implica-
tions of broadly applicable privacy laws and the need to clearly tailor laws with proper concern
for the obligations they impose and the duties they are designed to serve). The Supreme Court
of California ordered the trial court to overrule its order granting defendant magazine's general
demurrer without leave to amend, finding "the great general interest in an unfettered press may
at times be outweighed by other great societal interests" and that a "jury could reasonably find
that plaintiff's identity as a former hijacker was not newsworthy." Id. at 541.
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information is undoubtedly one of the most sacred and narrowly cir-
cumscribed principles in American law, inevitably there are instances
in which the public good involved in the release of the information is
negligible, while the personal injury to the individual subject is severe.
The hefty weight of the newsworthiness exception effectively pre-
cludes most claims of invasion of privacy by misappropriation of iden-
tity,211 absent a showing of an exclusively commercial purpose, even
though there may be an arguable commercial element in the use, or at
least a negligible social value.212
If this susceptibility to unwanted publicity and notoriety is the cost
of a society in which freedom of speech is held sacred, then it must be
endured. However, it must be endured by all individuals and not alle-
viated when the individual can assert that, by virtue of his or her fame,
any marginally commercial use of identity constitutes a recoverable
economic loss for that individual. Part III discussed three primary
claims of this Comment: 1) the average person faces severe difficulty
in establishing that a less than blatantly commercial use of identity
should result in recovery under the right of privacy; 2) the free speech
interest is overridden more readily when a showing of unjust enrich-
ment is achieved in the context of the right of publicity; and 3) the
typical right of publicity plaintiffs are the celebrities, whose economic
value in their own identities is presumed by nature of their fame.
These contentions lay the basis for the impact of this Comment. The
current state of the dichotomy between privacy and publicity enforces
the strict, though essential, restrictions of the First Amendment
against the average individual. Yet, famous persons recover for uses
of identity that have significant noncommercial merit. This disparity
not only threatens the social and cultural necessities of commentary
and parody, it exacerbates the existing economic and cultural domi-
nance of the famous individual in American culture.
A. Cultural Significance of a "Wheel Spun Out of Control" 213
The right of publicity is the legal response to a culture of mass me-
dia commercialism and associative valuation of celebrity. There are
differing theories on why the right of privacy developed to preclude
211. See Theodore L. Glasser, Resolving the Press-Privacy Conflict: Approaches to the "New-
sworthiness" Defense, in PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY: READINGS FROM COMMUNICATIONS IN THE
LAW 2, at 17 (Theodore R. Kupferman ed., 1990) (In reality it is nearly impossible for an individ-
ual to demonstrate invasion of privacy when virtually everything published is considered "news"
and therefore privileged.).
212. See WILLIAM ZELERMYER, INVASION OF PRIVACY 105 (1959) ("[P]ublic curiosity is not
public interest.").
213. See Langvardt, supra note 190.
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claims based on economic harm to celebrities. Professor Sheldon Hal-
pern argues that celebrity itself was not a commodity at the time the
right of privacy was created.2 1 4 On the other hand, Professor Michael
Madow argues that the commodification of celebrities has existed
since the eighteenth century, 21 5 and that it is only society's valuation
of this commodification that has given the economic right of publicity
legal effect.
It has been suggested that the phenomenon of fame, as in the condi-
tion of being celebrated, is inherent in human interpersonal relations,
an ancient centralizing device separating the leaders from the tribe.216
The prominence of the right of publicity is undoubtedly correlative to
the modern societal system of mass media commercialization, 21 7 and
perhaps the modern fascination with celebrity. As Professor Kwall
states, it is "not surprising that our obsession with fame and our rever-
ence for celebrities have given rise to a unique doctrine designed to
protect against unauthorized attempts to utilize famous personas. ' '218
The emergence, development, and expansion of the right of public-
ity are directly attributable to the modern fascination with and com-
modification of celebrities. As this Comment argues, the right of
publicity-particularly in its practical exclusion of private individuals
unable to make a claim of economic harm-can lead to disparate
treatment between famous and unknown individuals. Different treat-
ment of famous and anonymous people, especially under the law, has
dangerous implications to modern culture and the potential creation
of une nouvelle forme d'aristocratie (a new form of aristocracy). 21 9
This "aristocracy" populates every facet of daily life in American
mass media culture. From the newsstand to the television to everyday
public discourse, the American people are ceaselessly inundated with
images of the rich and beautiful. The widespread acceptance by the
general public of the societal role of the celebrity, including the im-
mense compensation, the luxurious lifestyle, and the frequent excep-
tional treatment by various societal institutions that many celebrities
214. See Halpern, supra note 23, at 1205.
215. See Madow, supra note 23, at 148. Madow explains that in 1774 Josiah Wedgwood cre-
ated a series of medallions as well as many household objects featuring the faces of famous men
of the time, such as Benjamin Franklin. Id.
216. See JAMES B. TWITCHELL, ADCULT USA: THE TRIUMPH OF ADVERTISING IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 131 (1996).
217. See Kahn, supra note 16, at 214 (stating that the emergence of the right of publicity "is
perhaps to be expected in a world where seemingly everything has been turned into a saleable
commodity").
218. See Kwall, supra note 8, at 2.
219. See Reiter, supra note 187, at 718 (citing Gregoire Loiseau, Des droits patrimoniaux de la
personnalite en droit francais, 42 MCGILL L.J. 319, 327 (1997)).
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enjoy, reflects a pervasive understanding in American culture that the
famous are entitled to more than the average person.
Objections to the cultural reverence for fame and celebrity, al-
though justifiable, do not alleviate the difficulties surrounding the ten-
sion between the right of publicity and the First Amendment. As
Professor Halpern states, "in postulating the kind of society we might
like-one in which fame does not have economic value apart from the
activity that creates the notoriety ... we should not blind ourselves to
reality. ' '220 Given that "reality," it is the responsibility of the law to
prevent overexpansion and abuse of the legal interest in the economic
value of a persona that has been granted through the right of
publicity.
B. Balancing the Scales
The inequities between modern right of privacy law, the legal cause
of the common person, and the modern right of publicity, the right of
the celebrity, can be envisioned each as two weights balancing on a
scale. While the rights of private individuals who assert privacy claims
are drawn downward by the weight of the First Amendment, the right
of publicity is less encumbered by this strain. Contributing to the ele-
vated position of the right of publicity is the availability of the theory
of unjust enrichment in countering the protection of the First Amend-
ment, a legal theory often available only to those individuals who can
demonstrate an economic value in their own persona. In order to bal-
ance the scale more evenly, the overly broad deference to the right of
publicity must be narrowly and consistently construed when the use
involved is only marginally commercial and significantly expressive.
Additionally, the unjust enrichment theory would need to be applied
to the use of the identity of the private unknown individual without
consent for a negligible social and significantly commercial purpose.
1. Narrowing the Right of Publicity to Allow Expressive Use of
Identity in Parody and Social Commentary
In her criticism of the Ninth Circuit's decision in White,221 Professor
Arlene W. Langvardt terms the overexpansive right of publicity
granted in this decision a "wheel spun out of control. ' 222 She main-
tains that an overly broad protection under the right of publicity
"threatens freedom of expression by furnishing little acceptable notice
220. See Halpern, supra note 23, at 1235.
221. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
222. See generally Langvardt, supra note 187.
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of what will or will not violate the celebrity's property right and by
making parodists and others engaged in commentary especially vul-
nerable to liability. '223 The expansion of the right of publicity and the
corollary reflection on modern culture demonstrate the need to tailor
this right to the specific purposes for which it is meant to serve and to
ensure protection for the average person under the same theory of
unjust enrichment justifying recovery for famous individuals.
2. Distributing the "Benefit to the Defendant" to the Injured
Individual; Compensating Private Individuals
Cultural commentator and author Neal Gabler writes, "while an en-
tertainment-driven, celebrity-oriented society is not necessarily one
that destroys all moral value as some would have it, it is one in which
the standard of value is whether or not something can grab and hold
the public's attention."22 4 Because the selling power of the private
individual's identity is not necessarily realized, unauthorized use does
not create unjust enrichment. But this economic construction may not
be applicable from the viewpoint of the nonfamous plaintiff. That is,
if there is a financial benefit to the unauthorized user that can in some
way be directly linked to use of the particular image, provided the use
is significantly commercial and not entitled to the complete First
Amendment protection of an expressive work, should an individual
whose identity is appropriated be entitled to some economic
contribution?
The concept of compensating individuals for use of identity, outside
of a clearly delineated exception for newsworthy and expressive uses,
is not impracticable. It can be understood as an extension of a model-
ing transaction in which an advertiser, or other party soliciting a com-
mercial transaction, purchases the use of the desired persona. While
this transaction will take the form of legal remedy, and therefore have
more of the character of a de facto modeling contract, it will nonethe-
less provide some form of legal vindication for a violation of both the
privacy and publicity rights. The private individual, whose identity
may not have the readily identifiable value of that of a famous person,
may claim violation of the right of publicity on the same unjust enrich-
ment theory employed by celebrities because the defendant will have
received "free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have a market
value and for which he [or she] would normally pay. '225
223. Id. at 440.
224. See GABLER, supra note 8, at 8.
225. See Kalven, supra note 206, at 331.
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Because the same theory of unjust enrichment applies to both ce-
lebrities whose economic value of identity is evident by virtue of their
fame, and private individuals whose economic value can be assumed
by virtue of the fact that unknown individuals are frequently paid for
their contribution of identity, both should be entitled to recovery
under the right of publicity. This notion of just compensation draws
from the property and liability approach Professor Kwall advocates,
which awards damages for publicity claims rather than any sort of in-
junctive relief, so as not to thwart the purposes of the First Amend-
ment.226 This right would effectively provide vindication of both
personal and economic interests. 22 7
V. CONCLUSION
From its beginning, the parameters of the right of publicity were not
expressly clear nor were its theoretical entanglements with the right of
privacy precisely severed. 228 These deficiencies2 29 have lead to the
confusion and disagreement that plagues the current state of the law
governing the right of individuals against unauthorized use of their
names and likenesses for commercial purposes. One of the foremost
criticisms of the right of publicity has been the inexact nature of the
scope of this right.230 Still, the right of publicity undeniably exists and
comparing it to the right of privacy is essential in understanding the
reality of its applicability and impact. As the right of publicity re-
mains clouted with confusion, reevaluation of the purposes for which
it is invoked, the uses it addresses, and its relation to the right of pri-
vacy is in order.231 The differing requirements of the personal right
226. See generally Kwall, supra note 196.
227. For further support and detail, see MCCARTHY'S discussion of a "right of identity" con-
cept which incorporates both publicity and privacy interests. See McCarthy, supra note 12,
§ 1:39.
228. See Kwall, supra note 10, at 254. In an analysis of the emerging right of publicity, Profes-
sor Kwall warns against the danger involved in failing to make a clear delineation between these
two rights stating, "If the right of publicity is to function as an independent legal doctrine, its
limitations must be defined without reference to the right of privacy." Id.
229. See generally Madow, supra note 23 (arguing against legal recognition of the right of
publicity through criticism of its foundational legal and cultural principles as well as its applica-
tion in case law).
230. See generally Langvardt, supra note 187 (arguing against the over-expansive statutory
and common law interpretations of the right of publicity).
231. See Haemmerli, supra note 25, at 389. Haemmerli stated:
The timing is propitious for an overhaul of the right of publicity. Existing doctrine
remains in a state of disarray that leaves room for wrongs without remedies, despite its
characterization as a field of 'settled' law, with a 'self-evident' philosophical basis. Ex-
isting practice is equally confused, with fifty state regimes protecting differing aspects
of identity, for varied terms, and with disparate remedies. As the right has become
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against invasion of privacy and the economic harm of the right of pub-
licity reflects a denial of rights to certain individuals who can neither
assert a privacy right due to the public nature of their identities nor
recover under the right of publicity absent a showing of economic
harm.232 However, this area of the law is in the process of defining
itself and its scope. As Professor McCarthy states:
[T]he history of the right of publicity is hardly over. Like a statute
emerging from the formless block of stone, it is still rough-hewn.
Much work remains before we will have a legal right of polished
contours. And like any legal right, it will never be "finished." It
remains for each generation to adapt it to their own society and
values.233
It is essential in this modern-day age of mass media that the lines
drawn by the right of publicity are clearly delineated and even-
handedly distributed so as to balance the competing interests of per-
sonal control over the commercial use of one's image and the princi-
ple of free speech. The alternative course of action is to become a
culture guilty not only of allowing an undeserved economic windfall
for the rich and famous, but one that also denies the average person,
asserting a similar claim, any recourse under the law.
Claire E. Gorman*
more important in economic terms, the need to reassess it, reformulate it, and legislate
it at the federal level has become concomitantly more pressing.
Id. (citations ommited).
232. Id. at 233. Professor Kahn argues that, despite the prominence of the property-based
analysis of appropriation applied to the right of publicity, they remain entwined with the iden-
tity-based personal interests of the integrity of the persona. Id.
233. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 1:38.
* Special thanks to Professor Maureen Collins for her careful review of this Comment and
her unending support.
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